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1. INTRODUCTION
The market dynamics of technology stocks during the late nineties indi-
cate a connection between trading volume and stock price overvaluation.
In the case of Palm and 3Com, analyzed by Lamont and Thaler (2003a),
the market valuation of Palm surpassed its parent company, 3Com, by
over 20 billion dollars in March, 2000. At the same time, the available
shares of Palm changed hands every week. This pattern was not unique to
Palm-3Com, Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Cochrane (2003) document
the association between high prices and trading volume in the technology
sector.
Although trading volume does not play a role in classic asset pricing
theory, several recent papers have articulated theories that establish a con-
nection between overvaluation and trading volume. Following the basic in-
sights of Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Chen, Hong and Stein
(2002), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong
(2004) emphasize the joint eﬀects of short-sales constraints and heteroge-
neous beliefs on stock prices. When the ability of arbitrageurs to short
overvalued shares is limited,1 the marginal buyer of shares tends to be an
optimist. This introduces a speculative motive among investors. An asset
owner has the option to resell his shares to other more optimistic investors
in the future for a proﬁt, and equilibrium prices reﬂect this option. Typ-
ically, as the volatility of the diﬀerence in investors’ opinions increases,
investors trade more often and the value of the resale option also increases.
This results in a positive association between trading volume and prices.
It is complicated to directly test overvaluation with data from the Nasdaq
stocks because of the diﬃculty in measuring fundamental values of these
stocks. In this paper, we use a unique data set from Chinese stock markets
to investigate the joint eﬀects of short-sales constraints and heterogeneous
beliefs on trading volume and stock prices. Chinese stock markets are
well suited for such an analysis for several reasons. First, short-sales of
stocks are prohibited by law, and equity derivatives markets had not yet
been developed during the sample period we use. Second, equity issuance
1In reality, these restrictions arise from many distinct sources. First, in many mar-
kets, short selling requires borrowing a security, and this mechanism is costly. Duﬃe,
Garleanu and Pedersen (2002) provide an equilibrium model that endogenously deter-
mines shorting cost, and links overvaluation to short interest and securities’ lending
fees. D’Avolio (2002) provides an empirical analysis of shorting cost in the U.S. stock
markets. Second, the risk associated with short selling may deter risk-averse investors.
Third, limitations to the availability of capital to potential arbitrageurs may also limit
short selling. See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a formal argument. Fourth, relative
performance evaluation creates barriers for institutional investors to take short posi-
tions. See Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) for an empirical analysis of such a force in
the Internet bubble. Finally, shorting is simply prohibited by law in the China’s stock
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and buy-backs, a common practice that ﬁrms use to “arbitrage” the miss-
valuation of their own stocks, are severely constrained by the restrictive
rules imposed by the government. Third, Chinese stock markets were only
re-opened in early 1990s after being closed for nearly half a century. Thus,
stock trading was new to most domestic investors and created excitement
and interest among them, just like Internet stocks were to U.S. investors
in the late 1990s. More importantly, during the period 1993-2000, several
dozen ﬁrms oﬀered two classes of shares, class A and class B, with identical
rights. Until 2001, domestic investors could only buy A shares while foreign
investors could only hold B shares. Despite their identical payoﬀs and
voting rights, class A shares traded on average for 420% more than the
corresponding B shares. In addition, A shares turned over at a much higher
rate - 500% versus 100% per year for B shares. The high price and heavy
share turnover of A shares echo observations on the Nasdaq bubble.
The main hypothesis of our empirical analysis is that the speculative mo-
tive of A-share (domestic) investors generated a speculative component in
A-share prices, and this component is positively related to A-share turnover
rate. The identical payoﬀ structure of A and B shares allows us to con-
trol for stock fundamentals. Thus, we focus on the cross-sectional relation
between the A-B share premia and their turnover rates. The stringent
short-sales constraints avoid potential complications arising from estimat-
ing stocks’ short-selling cost. The relatively large panel (73 stocks) also
permits us to control for cross-sectional diﬀerences in risk and liquidity, as
well as for the time variation of interest rates and risk premium.
We ﬁnd that A-share turnover had a signiﬁcant and positive correlation
with the A-B share premium in the period of 1993-2000, and explained, on
average, 20% of the monthly cross sectional variation of this premium. We
also show that the A-B premium and A-share turnover both increased with
ﬁrms’ idiosyncratic return volatility, a proxy for fundamental uncertainty.
Although standard asset-pricing theories suggest that fundamental uncer-
tainty reduces asset prices, these results support our hypothesis because
fundamental uncertainty tends to create more ﬂuctuation in heterogeneous
beliefs among investors and therefore leads to more trading and to a larger
speculative component in prices.
We also perform several robustness exercises. We control for the eﬀect of
liquidity using the proportion of no-price-change days in a month for each
share.2 This does not signiﬁcantly change the eﬀect of A-share turnover
on A-B share premia. To determine whether trading in A-share and B-
share markets was driven by reason of speculation or liquidity, we examine
the cross-sectional correlation between share turnover and asset ﬂoat (the
2This variable has been found to be an eﬀective measure of market liquidity in U.S.
stock markets and several emerging markets by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999)
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total market value of publicly available shares) for both A and B shares.
Liquidity typically improves as asset ﬂoat increases. On the other hand,
a negative correlation between turnover and ﬂoat is consistent with the
implications of speculative trading theories, since it takes a larger disper-
sion in investors’ beliefs for a larger ﬂoat of shares to change hands when
investors are risk averse. We ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant association
between share turnover and asset ﬂoat in A-share markets in the period of
1993-2000, suggesting that the trading volume of A shares was not mainly
a result of liquidity. As further robustness checks, we control for several
measures of risk. We ﬁnd that the strong association between A-share
turnover and the A-B premium was still present. We also estimate a panel
regression of the A-B share premium on A-share and B-share turnover with
time and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. We again ﬁnd that A-share turnover rate had
a positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on A-B premium. In addition, the
variation in the time eﬀect coeﬃcients is well explained (R2 = 85%) by a
linear combination of Chinese and world interest rates and China’s politi-
cal risk premium as measured in the dollar denominated Chinese sovereign
bond spread.
Our results corroborate the ﬁnding of Cochrane (2003) that there was
a positive cross-sectional correlation between the market/book ratio of US
stocks and their turnover rates during the Nasdaq bubble period of 1996-
2000. Our analysis shows that such a relation between stock prices and
trading volume is present beyond this speciﬁc period of U.S. markets, and
is robust even after controlling for many other factors such as liquidity,
discount rate and risk premium.
This paper is also related to recent literature analyzing the eﬀects of
short-sales constraints on stock returns. Jones and Lamont (2002) use
U.S. data from the 1920s, when rebate rates, one of the prime shorting
costs, were published. They show that stocks with higher shorting costs
tend to have lower returns. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) use breath of
ownership in a ﬁrm to proxy for heterogeneous beliefs among investors,
while Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) use the dispersion in analyst
forecasts. They all ﬁnd that stocks associated with higher belief disper-
sions tend to have lower returns. Our analysis complements these studies
by using share turnover, a direct consequence of heterogeneous belief ﬂuc-
tuations, to analyze the overvaluation caused by short-sales constraints.
Our analysis also adds to earlier studies on relative pricing between se-
curities with identical or similar fundamentals. See Lamont and Thaler
(2003b) for a review of these studies. For example, Froot and Dabora
(1999) examine three examples of twin shares, including Royal Dutch and
Shell, that are traded in diﬀerent markets across the world. Although these
examples demonstrate the existence of non-fundamental components in as-
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fundamental components. The relatively simple environment in China’s
stock markets (strictly enforced restrictions on short-sales, segmentation of
A and B shares, and lack of derivatives markets) and the relatively large
sample of A-B pairs allow us to identify speculative trading by investors as
an important determinant of stock prices.
Our study also contributes to the international ﬁnance literature for ex-
plaining the diﬀerence in prices between diﬀerent classes of shares, which
includes diﬀerential discount rates and risk factors, diﬀerential demand
curves, asymmetry of information. These arguments have been applied
to understand the A-B share premium after it was documented by Bailey
(1994). Fernald and Rogers (2002) propose that the A-B share premium
may be caused by the diﬀerence in discount factors for the A and B shares,
since Chinese local investors and foreign investors face diﬀerent investment
opportunity sets and have diﬀerent risk exposure. Chan, Menkveld and
Yang (2003) also show some evidence supporting better informed domestic
investors. We take into account these arguments by incorporating the pre-
vailing interest rates in China and abroad, the political risk of China, the
market risk and ﬁrm speciﬁc risk of both A and B shares, and the market
capitalization of both A and B shares in our analysis. Our study conﬁrms
the importance of these eﬀects. More importantly, we show that the eﬀect
of speculative trading on A-B share premia is not aﬀected by these controls.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
empirical hypotheses. In Section 3, we introduce the institutions of the
Chinese stock markets. In Section 4, we report our empirical analysis on
the A-B share premium. Section 5 further examines the price determinants
based on a natural experiment caused by the government’s policy shift in
2001. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES
Our analysis builds on the growing literature that models the joint ef-
fects of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints on asset prices.
In a static setting, a stock’s price will be upwardly biased when there is
a suﬃcient divergence of opinion because it will only reﬂect the valua-
tions of the optimists, as pessimists simply sit out of the market instead
of short-selling (see, e.g., Miller (1977), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002)). In
a dynamic setting, these two ingredients also generate a non-fundamental
(or speculative) component in asset prices (see, e.g., Harrison and Kreps
(1978), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)). Investors pay prices that exceed
their own valuation of future dividends as they anticipate ﬁnding a buyer
willing to pay even more in the future. As a result of this resale option,
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Investors often diﬀer in their beliefs about stock fundamentals. Overcon-
ﬁdence, a widely observed behavioral bias in psychological studies, provides
a convenient way to generate heterogeneous beliefs.3 Overconﬁdence can
lead investors to diﬀer in their information processing, i.e., some investors
might choose to overweigh a subset of available information in analyz-
ing asset fundamentals, while other investors might overweigh another set,
therefore generating heterogeneous beliefs. The diﬀerence in investors’ be-
liefs will ﬂuctuate more if these investors are more overconﬁdent and more
varied in their information processing, or if there is more fundamental un-
certainty which leaves more room for opinions to diﬀer.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the relation between stock prices and
trading volume. When short-sales of assets are constrained, heterogeneous
beliefs create speculative motives for investors. An asset owner expects
not only to collect future cash ﬂows from the asset, but also to proﬁt
from other investors’ over-optimism in the future by selling the share at
a price higher than he thinks it is worth. Thus, the price of an asset can
be divided into two components: the fundamental valuation of the asset
owner if forced to hold the asset forever and collect all the future cashﬂows,
and the speculative component generated by the asset owner’s option to
sell the share for a speculative proﬁt.
The magnitude of the speculative component is positively related to trade
frequency. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) oﬀer a continuous-time model
that produces this relationship. They show that the resale option, anal-
ogous to standard ﬁnancial options but with the diﬀerence in investors’
beliefs serving as the underlying asset, is valuable to the asset owner even
if other investors’ beliefs are currently lower. In particular, the valuation
of the resale option depends crucially on the volatility of the diﬀerence in
beliefs, which increases with both investor overconﬁdence and the funda-
mental volatility of the asset. As the diﬀerence in investors’ beliefs become
more volatile, the resale option becomes more valuable; at the same time,
investors trade more frequently with each other. Hence we have the follow-
ing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: When investors have heterogeneous beliefs about asset
fundamentals and are constrained from short-selling shares, both the specu-
lative component and share turnover increase with the volatility of the dif-
ference in investors’ beliefs. Thus, there is a positive relationship between
the speculative component in asset prices and the turnover of shares.
3Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) review the
related psychological evidence and discuss the implications of overconﬁdence onﬁnancial
markets. Heterogeneous beliefs could also come from other sources. For example, Morris
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We will use the pairs of A- and B-shares in China’s stock markets to
measure the speculative component in prices and examine its relationship
to turnover, as highlighted in Hypothesis 1.
We will also examine the relation between share turnover and asset ﬂoat,
i.e., the value of shares available for trading in the market. When investors
are risk averse and not fully diversiﬁed, a larger asset ﬂoat means that
it will take a greater divergence of opinion in the future for asset owners
to resell all their shares for a speculative proﬁt, implying that the resale
option is less valuable today. Indeed, Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2004)
provide a model to show that, as asset ﬂoat increases, the “strike price”
of the resale option also increases. Since asset owners are less likely to
exercise their resale option, it becomes less valuable and the share turnover
rate becomes smaller. Thus, we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: When investors have heterogeneous beliefs about as-
set fundamentals, are risk averse, and are constrained from short-selling
shares, the speculative component in share prices and the share turnover
rate decrease with asset ﬂoat.
Another determining factor in the relationship between asset prices and
share turnover is liquidity. Investors often need to trade assets for portfolio
rebalancing or other liquidity reasons, and assets diﬀer in transaction cost
and the level of diﬃculty in matching buyers with sellers. Duﬃe, Garleanu
and Pedersen (2003), Vayanos and Wang (2003) and Weill (2003) provide
theoretical models to analyze the eﬀects of liquidity on asset prices and
trading volume, based on a search process between buyers and sellers. It is
intuitive that liquid assets tend to have higher prices and larger turnover
rates. These models also predict that share turnover is positively related
to asset ﬂoat when investors trade for liquidity reasons, opposite to the
prediction in Hypothesis 2. The basic argument is that when asset ﬂoat
becomes larger, it is easier for a seller to match with a buyer. Hence a
liquidity story implies:
Hypothesis 3: When investors trade purely for liquidity reasons, the
turnover rate of shares increases with asset ﬂoat.
Hence, a ﬁnding that turnover is positively related to asset ﬂoat is con-
sistent with the speculative motive, but not with trading done only for
liquidity reasons.
3. THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
3.1. The Market
The Chinese stock market is relatively young and is dominated by inex-
perienced individual investors. The two stock exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen were established in 1990. These exchanges listed shares of par-
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- by 2001 each exchange listed more than 500 companies and the total
market cap of Chinese stocks exceeded US$500 billion. The number of
shareholders increased 160 times, from 400,000 in 1991 to more than 64
million in 2001.
FIG. 1. Shanghai A and B Share Price Indices
Shanghai A (thin line) and B (thick line) share-price indices between January 1992 and
January 2003.
Over its initial period (1992-2002), the Chinese market displayed remark-
able booms and busts, a pattern similar to U.S. technology stocks in late
nineties. Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of the Shanghai A-share and
B-share indices. Beginning in 1991, the Shanghai A-share index went from
100 to 250 in less than a year and then reached 1200 by the ﬁrst quarter of
1992. Starting in June 1992, the Shanghai index dropped by more than 60
percent in a period of ﬁve months. Within a few days of hitting bottom,
the bull market returned. In just three months, the overall market index
rose from 400 to a new height of 1600. However, by the mid 1994 the index
was back to 400. In the second half of the decade the market generally
trended up, but as it can be seen from the ﬁgure, there were numerous
episodes in which the index lost several hundred points in a short period.
For example, during the 1993-2001 period, there were 20 “mini-crashes”
when the Shanghai A-share market Index lost more than 10% in a month,
but only 8 similar episodes in the Nasdaq.
Like the technology stocks in the U.S., the Chinese stock market had very
high turnover. From 1991 to 2001, class A shares turned over on average
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of DotCom ﬁrms in their heyday (Ofek and Richardson, 2001), and more
than ﬁve times the turnover rate of a typical NYSE stock.
The heavy turnover rate of A shares is puzzling from the perspective
of standard models of asset trading, especially given the high transactions
cost in Chinese stock markets. During most of the 1990s, each side of a
trade on the Shanghai Stock Exchange had to pay a 0.4% commission fee
to the broker and a 0.3% stamp tax to the government.4 Thus, any trade
would incur a total fee of 1.4% of the proceeds, in addition to other costs
such as the price impact of trades. A turnover rate of 500% a year implies
that 7% of the A-share market capitalization was paid as direct trading
fees each year. This number is hard to justify from the usual hedging or
portfolio rebalancing arguments.5
There are several features of the Chinese market during this period that
make it particularly suited for testing the joint eﬀects of short-sales con-
straints and heterogeneous beliefs.
Chinese residents face a very stringent “short-sale” constraint. Chinese
investors’ accounts are kept centrally at the stock exchanges, and it is illegal
to sell short. An exchange’s computer always checks an investor’s position
before it executes a trade. This trading system makes it very diﬃcult for
ﬁnancial institutions to lend stocks to their clients for short selling purposes.
Moreover, there are no futures or option markets on stocks in China.6
Normally, when equity prices exceed their fundamental values, compa-
nies will increase the supply of equities to arbitrage the diﬀerence. Baker
and Wurgler (2002) present strong evidence of market timing by U.S. ﬁrms,
showing that ﬁrms tend to issue equity when their market value is high.
This automatic market correction mechanism is impaired in China because
of the tight government control over IPOs and seasoned equity oﬀerings
(SEOs). Chinese companies need government approval to sell their equity.
The process is highly political and companies often have to wait years
to issue shares. Strict quotas, which generally bind, stop many qualify-
ing companies from taking advantage of favorable market conditions to sell
their shares. Similarly, when equity prices fall below their fundamental val-
4See the oﬃcial website of Shanghai Stock Exchange: http://www.sse.com.cn.
5The trading activity in the Chinese markets is much heavier than the neighboring
markets. For example, the average turnover rates in 1994 and 1995 for Indonesia, Japan,
and Korea are 23%, 24%, and 125%, respectively, according to Morgan Stanley Inter-
national Portfolio Desk, IFC Stock Market Factbook (1996) and Dow Jones Research.
The direct transaction costs per round-trip trade for Indonesia, Japan, and Korea are
1.6%, 0.7%, and 1.3% respectively.
6The government banned bond futures market in 1994 because of a price manipulation
scandal and has also put the development of equity derivatives markets on hold. So
far, no equity derivatives have be legally traded in China due to a lack of government
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ues, companies are also prevented from share buy-backs due to restrictive
Chinese corporate law.7
Stock trading was also new to most domestic participants. The Chinese
stock market only resumed its operation in the early 1990s after being shut
down for nearly half a century. In our sample period, it was dominated
by individual investors. Investment institutions such as mutual funds and
pension funds were still in an early stage of development. According to
a recent report of the World Bank, “at the end of 1999, of the 30 per-
cent of tradable shares, individuals held 25 percent and institutions held 5
percent” (Tenev, Zhang, and Brefort, 2002, page 77). Feng and Seasholes
(2003) summarize the demographic information of a sample of 90,478 ac-
tively investing individuals in China, and ﬁnd that these individuals are
much younger and have less investing/trading experience than a typical
individual investor in U.S.
Given the typical Chinese investor’s lack of experience, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that these investors would often disagree about stock valuation
and as a result would engage in intensive speculative trading, just as many
individual U.S. investors speculated in Internet stocks in late nineties.8 In
the presence of strict short-sales constraints and less experienced individual
investors, this situation seems well suited to the mechanism described in
Section 2 and we proceed to test its implications.
3.2. Twin Shares
A unique feature of the Chinese market is that several dozen companies
issued “twin” shares – two classes of common shares with identical voting
and dividend rights, listed on the same exchanges (Shanghai or Shenzhen
stock exchanges), but traded by diﬀerent participants. Class A shares were
restricted to domestic residents. Class B shares were conﬁned to foreigners
before February 2001 when domestic residents were allowed to purchase B
shares using foreign currency. Even after the rule change, capital controls
7It is worth noting that, while Chinese ﬁrms had almost no control over their IPO
or SEO process, the Chinese government does tend to issue more shares in a booming
market. However, the issuance is often based on a long waiting list whose order seems to
be more related to politics than to relative valuations in the market place. As a result,
while the new issues approved by the government may take advantage of overall market
conditions, they are not meant to address relative mis-valuations in the marketplace.
As late as 2002, a World Bank Report states “...future decisions about which companies
will access the market and when and where they will do so will be based on market
principles.” (Tenev, Zhang, and Brefort, 2002, page 111. The emphasis is ours.)
8There are also psychological experiments indicating that overconﬁdence is more pro-
nounced in the face of more diﬃcult tasks (Lichtenstein, Fischhoﬀ, and Phillips, 1982).
This evidence again motivates our hypothesis that Chinese investors were more likely to
display overconﬁdence and therefore be involved in speculative trading, especially rela-
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continued to serve to restrict Chinese residents’ ability to acquire B shares.
In the period 1993-2001, 75 companies had both class A and class B shares.
Our sample covers prices and other characteristics for all ﬁrms that listed
both A and B shares from 1993-2001. The data include daily closing prices,
monthly returns (with dividend reinvested), annual dividends and earnings
per share, turnover, and the number of ﬂoating shares.9 Our sample period
of 1993 to 2001 covers the market slump from 1993-1995, a bull market in
1996-1997 and a stock boom from 1999-2001. There was also the important
regime change in February 2001, when the Chinese government changed
the regulations on B-shares, allowing domestic investors to legally own and
trade them if they have foreign currency.
TABLE 1.
Summary Statistics of A-B Pairs
Turnover Premium % of No-price- Log (asset
(monthly) change Days ﬂoat)
Mean A 47.4% 421.8% 2.1% 19.63
B 10.7% 14.3% 19.13
Cross-sectional STD A 18.5% 167.3% 3.0% 0.801
B 5.3% 11.8% 0.909
This table provides summary statistics for all ﬁrms that had issued both A-shares and
B-shares between April 1993 and December 2001. There were 75 such ﬁrms. The share
turnover is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the number of ﬂoating
shares, the logarithm of asset ﬂoat is based on the market value of ﬂoating shares, and
the premium is deﬁned as the ratio of A-share price over B-share price minus one. These
three variables are available for the period April 1993 — December 2001. The fraction of
no-price-change days is calculated directly from daily prices for the sample period January
1995 — December 2001. The Cross-sectional STD of a variable is calculated as the time
average of cross-sectional standard deviation.
Table 1 provides some simple comparisons between A and B shares, based
on matching the A and B shares of the same companies in the sample.
While there were about 1250 ﬁrms on the two exchanges, only 75 ﬁrms
issued both A and B shares. It is worth noting that the issuance of both
types of share was usually not determined by the ﬁrm, but by central
government policies. A shares were more actively traded than B shares.
A shares turned over on average at a monthly rate of 47.4%, which is
equivalent to an annual rate of 569%. A-share turnover rate was four times
that of B shares (10.7% per month or 128% per year) during the sample
period. There was also more cross-sectional variation of turnover in A
9The data are obtained from Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Inc., which
has recently reached an cooperative agreement with Wharton Research Data Service
(WRDS) to incorporate GTA research databases on China’s security markets into the
WRDS. We have also conﬁrmed part of our data from GTA with the data that we
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shares than in B shares. The average cross-sectional variation of monthly
turnover in A shares was 18.5% compared to 5.3% for B shares.
Table 1 also provides some simple statistics on the A-share price premium
over the corresponding B share. On average, A shares fetched a 421.8%
premium over B shares, even though they were entitled to the same legal
rights and claim to dividends.10 The presence of such a large domestic
share premium is quite diﬀerent from many other emerging and developed
markets where domestic shares generally sell at a discount. Hietala (1989),
Bailey and Jagtiani (1994), and Stulz and Wasserfallen (1993) have found
a price discount for domestic shares in Finland, Thailand and Switzerland.
Typically in these countries a class of restricted shares is oﬀered to local
investors only, and another class of unrestricted shares are oﬀered to both
local and foreign investors. The restricted local shares usually sell at a
discount. However, both China’s A and B shares were restricted shares
especially before the B shares were opened to local investors in February
2001. Even after February 2001, Chinese capital controls still imposed
restrictions on the ownership of B shares by local investors.
Figure 2 presents a graphic plot of the equally weighted average A-share
premium over time. The premium rose from 300% in April 1993 to about
800% in March 1999 and then fell to 100% at the end of 2001. The re-
laxation of restrictions on the purchase of B shares by domestic investors
in February 2001 did not eliminate all premia, which remained at a level
around 80%. This is because that domestic Chinese investors had limited
access to the necessary foreign currency.11 Figure 2 also provides the num-
ber of ﬁrms used in our study of A-B premia. This number changed over
time because of listings and de-listings, growing from less than 10 to over
70 during the sample period.
In addition to their large magnitude, the A-B share premia also varied
dramatically across ﬁrms. The average (over time) cross-sectional standard
deviation of the premia was 167%. This magnitude compares with a (time-
series) standard deviation of the average monthly premium of 193% during
the same period. Figure 2 also plots the cross-sectional standard deviation
of price premia over time, ﬂuctuating from 50% to over 400%. In the
empirical analysis that follows, we focus on explaining the cross-sectional
variation of the premia based on A-share investors’ speculative motive.
10Since B shares were traded in dollars and A shares in Yuans, the diﬀerence depends
on the exchange rate. We used the oﬃcial rate of the Bank of China. A black market
rate would lower the average premium, but would not aﬀect the cross sectional results
that we emphasize. In fact, according to Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002), the premium in
the black market rate was in single digits during the period 1994-2001.
11The only legal source of foreign currency for domestic investors is remittance from
overseas. Recently, the government has somewhat relaxed its currency control, allowing
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FIG. 2. A-B Share Price Premium and Number of Firms
Average A-B share premium (thick line), cross-sectional standard deviation of
A-B share premium (dash line), and the number of ﬁrms (thin line) that had
both A shares and B shares outstanding in each month for the period April 1993
- December 2001.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Could the existence of a speculative component help explain the large
variation of premia on A shares? In this section, we test this view. We
analyze the cross-sectional association between the A-B share premium,
share turnover rate, volatility, and asset ﬂoat as discussed in Section 2.
We also introduce several controls, including ﬁrms’ risk characteristics and
measures of liquidity. In addition, we present results from a panel regression
that controls for ﬁrm and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
4.1. Speculative Trading and Cross-sectional Variation of A-B
Share Premia
As argued in Section 2, the A-share price of a ﬁrm (the i-th ﬁrm), PA
i ,
can be decomposed as the sum of two components, fundamental and spec-
ulative. The fundamental component is the current expected value of dis-
counted future dividends adjusted for risk premium and we assume that,
in analogy to Gordon’s Growth Formula, it can be written as Ei
RA
it−gi, where
Ei is the expectation of current (unobservable) earnings, gi its growth rate
and RA
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where SA
it is the speculative component in the price of the ﬁrm’s A share.
This component depends on the volatility of the diﬀerence in beliefs among
the Chinese investors about the ﬁrm’s fundamental value and on the ﬂoat
of the ﬁrm’s A shares, among other variables.
In turn, the discount rate is given by
RA
it = rChina,t + µA
i
where rChina,t is the domestic interest rate available to Chinese investors
and µA
i is the risk premium which could be determined by the ﬁrm’s risk
characteristics.










it is the speculative component in the B-share market. This spec-
ulative component in B-shares is positive if foreign investors also display
heterogeneous beliefs about the fundamental value of the ﬁrm. In this case,
SB
it depends on the volatility of the diﬀerence in beliefs among the foreign
investors and on the ﬂoat of B-shares. The discount rate RB
it is given by
RB
it = rWorld,t + µB
i ,
with rWorld,t as the world interest rate and µB
i as the risk premium, which
should be inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s risk proﬁle and China’s sovereign risk
premium.
For simplicity, we will assume ﬁrst that the B-share price provides a
reasonable measure of the fundamental component of the ﬁrm value, that
is SB
it = 0. Later we will treat the case when SB
it > 0. Thus, a ﬁrm’s A and

























We start with this simpliﬁcation, although we will later bring back the
term involving the diﬀerence in discount rates.
Hypothesis 1 in Section 2 claims that, as the volatility of the diﬀerence
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the speculative component SA
it and the turnover rate of A shares move
in the same direction. There are several reasons why the volatility of the
diﬀerence in investors’ beliefs would vary across stocks. First, since A-share
markets were dominated by individual investors, each stock was likely to
have a diﬀerent investor base at a given point of time. Second, individuals
could display diﬀerent degrees of overconﬁdence with respect to information
related to individual stocks. Finally, assets may also diﬀer in the amount of
fundamental uncertainty that creates room for investors’ beliefs to diverge.
Thus, we predict a positive association between the A-B share premium
and the A-share turnover rate.
Since turnover rates are highly persistent over time and it is diﬃcult to
remove this persistence (Lo and Wang, 2000), we focus on explaining the
cross-sectional variation of A-B share premia. To examine this correlation,
we run the following cross-sectional regression of end-of-month A-B premia
on monthly average turnover rates:
ρit = c0t + c1tτA
it + c2tτB
it + it, (2)
where τA
it = log(1 + turnoverA
it) and τB
it = log(1 + turnoverB
it). Here, we
expect the coeﬃcient c1t to be positive. We incorporate the turnover of B
shares in the regression, since it is possible that a speculative component
may also exist in B shares (SB
it > 0). If this is the case, we expect a positive
relationship between SB
it and τB
it since both are generated by heterogeneous
beliefs among the foreign investors who trade the ﬁrm’s B shares and expect
that coeﬃcient c2t will be negative.
TABLE 2.
Cross-Sectional Regressions of A-B Share Premium (Monthly, April 1993
- December 2000)
c0t c1t c2t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 3.777 4.259 1.731 0.255
FM t-Stat 24.72 6.734 1.098
Average Marginal R
2 0.203 0.046
This table presents a summary of the following monthly cross-sectional
regressions:
ρit = c0t + c1tτA
it + c2tτB
it + εit,
where ρit is the A-B share premium for ﬁrm i in month t, τA
it = log(1 +
turnoverA
it), τB
it = log(1 + turnoverB
it). The reported coeﬃcients are
the time-series average of monthly estimates, weighted by the number
of observations each month. The Fama-MacBeth t-stat is computed by
the weighted average of the coeﬃcients divided by the modiﬁed standard
error as in Petersen (2005) to control for diﬀerent sample sizes. Average
Marginal R2 is the time-series average of marginal R2 of the monthly
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The results of this regression are reported in Table 2.12 In the period
that preceded the liberalization of B-shares trading to domestic investors
and that is covered by our data, April 1993 to December 2000, A- and B-
share turnover explained on average 25% of the cross-sectional variation in
A-B share premium. The average c1t, the coeﬃcient on A-share turnover,
is positive and signiﬁcant with a Fama-MacBeth t-statistics of 6.7,13 and
A-share turnover explained 20% of the cross sectional variation of the pre-
mium. A 5% increase in A-share turnover was associated with an increase
in excess of 21% of a stock’s A-B premium. The coeﬃcient of B-share
turnover, c2t, is not statistically signiﬁcant.14 The positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect of A-share turnover on A-B premium supports our main hypothe-
sis that A-share investors’ speculative motives contributed a speculative
component to A-share prices.
To further examine the source of the positive relationship between A-
share turnover and A-B premium, we analyze the eﬀects of return volatility
on share turnover and A-B premium. Our hypothesis suggests that the
speculative component in prices and share turnover both increase with the
volatility of the diﬀerence in investors’ beliefs. Since heterogeneous beliefs
are more likely to arise in ﬁrms with greater fundamental uncertainty, we
expect these ﬁrms to have a higher share turnover rate and also a higher
A-B share premium. We measure the fundamental uncertainty of a ﬁrm
by the idiosyncratic volatility of its stock returns.15
We obtain daily return data for each A-B pair and A-share market return
index during the period 1995-2001. We use all the available data of a ﬁrm’s
A share and the contemporaneous A-share market return index to estimate
the stock’s market beta and daily residual returns. We then estimate the
stock’s monthly idiosyncratic volatility based on the residual returns in
each month. The average of the monthly idiosyncratic volatility was 2.1%
and the cross-sectional standard deviation of the monthly idiosyncratic
volatility was 0.9%.
Panel A of Table 3 report the cross-sectional regressions of ﬁrms’ A-
share turnover onto the idiosyncratic volatility. The results show that there
12Since high turnover and high prices are often observed immediately after IPOs, we
only include ﬁrms in our panel one year after their IPOs.
13The Fama-MacBeth t-stat is computed by the average of the coeﬃcients divided
by the modiﬁed standard error calculated as in Petersen (2005) to control for diﬀerent
sample sizes.
14Although the point estimate is positive it is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Furthermore the panel regressions that appear below yield a negative and signiﬁcant
estimate.
15Earlier studies, e.g., Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2002), have used the dispersion in analyst forecast and breath of ownership as
proxies of heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs. However these variables are not available
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TABLE 3.
Eﬀects of Volatility on A-Share Turnover and A-B Premium (Monthly,
January 1995 - December 2000)
A. Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions for A-share Turnover
τ
A
it = α0t + α1tvol
A
i,t + εit
α0t α1t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬀ. 0.299 2.582 0.037
FM t-Stat 13.241 5.282
B. Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions for A-B Premium
ρit = c0t + c1tvol
A
i,t + εit
c0t c1t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬀ. 4.459 29.10 0.052
FM t-Stat 23.70 3.884
This table presents monthly cross-sectional regression of A-share
turnover, τA
it = log(1 + turnoverA
it), and A-B share premium on the
A-share idiosyncratic return volatility. Idiosyncratic return volatility is
measured by the standard deviation of daily idiosyncratic stock returns
within a monthly estimated CAPM model. The reported coeﬃcients are
the time-series average of monthly estimates, weighted by the number
of observations each month. The Fama-MacBeth t-stat is computed by
the weighted average of the coeﬃcients divided by the modiﬁed standard
error as in Petersen (2005) to control for diﬀerent sample sizes. Average
Marginal R2 is the time-series average of marginal R2 of the monthly
cross-sectional regressions.
was a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between A-share turnover and
idiosyncratic volatility, consistent with our hypothesis. Panel B of Table
3 reports the monthly cross-sectional regressions of A-B premium onto
the idiosyncratic volatility. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship
between A-B premium and A-share idiosyncratic volatility, again consistent
with our hypothesis that heterogeneous beliefs among domestic investors
have caused a speculative component in A-share prices.16
A positive relationship between share turnover and idiosyncratic volatil-
ity can also be explained by information heterogeneity or liquidity-driven
trades. For ﬁrms with greater fundamental uncertainty and return volatil-
ity, investors tend to possess more dispersed information and thus would
trade more often based on their private information. For these ﬁrms, in-
vestors also tend to rebalance their positions more often. However, these
mechanisms cannot explain a positive link between A-B premium and id-
16We could also use B-share idiosyncratic return volatility as an alternative proxy for
ﬁrms’ fundamental uncertainty. By repeating the cross-sectional regressions in Panel B of
Table 3 using B-share idiosyncratic volatility or using A-share and B-share idiosyncratic
volatility jointly, we have obtained similar results. We have also examined a cross-
sectional regression of B-share turnover on B-share idiosyncratic volatility, the coeﬃcient
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iosyncratic volatility. Standard asset-pricing theories suggest that asset
prices decrease with fundamental uncertainty and return volatility. First,
fundamental uncertainty typically makes markets more illiquid and causes a
larger illiquidity discount in prices. Second, a higher return volatility also
creates a greater risk for undiversiﬁed investors, possibly reducing asset
prices. Finally, recent studies by Shin and Stulz (2001) and Barnes (2001)
show empirical evidence that ﬁrms’ market-to-book ratio in US stock mar-
kets decreases with their equity returns’ idiosyncratic volatility and their
earnings volatility. Thus, our ﬁnding of a positive relationship between A-B
premium and idiosyncratic volatility, together with a positive relationship
between A-share turnover and idiosyncratic volatility, provides support for
our main hypothesis.17
4.2. Controlling for Liquidity
It may be argued that the relation between A-share turnover and A-B
premium was related to the market liquidity of A shares.18 If a ﬁrm’s A
shares were relatively more liquid, investors would have traded more and
been willing to pay more for these shares, because of the smaller transaction
cost. As such, cross-sectional diﬀerence in liquidity could also generate a
positive relationship between A-share turnover and A-B premium.
In reality, liquidity was unlikely to explain much of the the cross-sectional
variation of A-share prices. As discussed earlier, A-share markets were
dominated by individual investors. Domestic investment institutions such
as mutual funds and pension funds were not fully developed. The observed
turnover and the likely demand by individual investors indicate that liq-
uidity was not a problem. On the other hand, liquidity might have been a
problem for foreign institutions who invested in the B-share markets.
Nonetheless, we control for the eﬀects of liquidity in the A-B share pre-
mia, using the proportion of no-price-change days of a stock over a month
as a measure of liquidity. Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) use this
variable to measure liquidity for NYSE stocks, and ﬁnd that it is highly
correlated with other liquidity estimators such as quoted bid-ask spread
and Roll’s measure of the eﬀective spread. Recently, Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad (2003) suggest that this measure is particularly useful in emerg-
ing markets where direct measures of trading cost such as bid-ask spreads
are usually not available. They ﬁnd that the fraction of no-price-change
17An argument based on ﬁrms’ growth options also cannot explain the positive rela-
tionship between A-B premium and idiosyncratic return volatility, because both A-share
and B-share investors have the same growth options in ﬁrms.
18Liquidity is an important factor in explaining cross-sectional diﬀerences in stock
prices and stock returns. For example, see Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003) for U.S. stock prices and returns, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2003) for emerging market stock returns, and Chen and Xiong (2002) for prices of
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days is signiﬁcant in explaining expected stock returns, using data from 19
developing countries (China not included). On the other hand, they ﬁnd
that share turnover rates are not signiﬁcant.
Based on the daily return data for the period 1995-2001, Table 1 shows
that A shares averaged only 2.1% of trading days with no price changes
in this period, while the corresponding B shares averaged 14.3%. This
suggests that B shares were more illiquid than A shares.
TABLE 4.
Cross-Sectional Regressions of A-B Share Premium (Monthly, January
1995 - December 2000)
A. Turnover and No-price-change Days
c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 3.498 4.559 1.599 2.018 3.586 0.270
FM t-Stat 22.499 6.444 1.021 1.318 6.944
Average Marginal R
2 - 0.157 0.032 0.027 0.044
B. No-price-change Days Only
c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 4.622 2.215 4.557 0.091
FM t-Stat 23.08 1.376 8.091
Average Marginal R
2 - 0.029 0.060
This table presents a summary of the following monthly cross-sectional regressions:





where ρit is the A-B share premium for ﬁrm i in month t, τA





it is the proportion of no-price-change days for the A-shares of ﬁrm i in
month t, and zB
it is the proportion of no-price-change days for the B-shares of ﬁrm i in month
t. The reported coeﬃcients are the time-series average of monthly estimates, weighted by the
number of observations each month. The Fama-MacBeth t-stat is computed by the weighted
average of the coeﬃcients divided by the modiﬁed standard error as in Petersen (2005) to
control for diﬀerent sample sizes. Average Marginal R2 is the time-series average of marginal
R2 of the monthly cross-sectional regressions.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the cross-sectional regression of A-B share
premium on the turnover rates of A-shares and B-shares, and the corre-
sponding proportion of no-price-change days, denoted by zA
it and zB
it, for
the period 1995-2000 that preceded the liberalization of B-shares. A com-
parison with Table 2 shows that using our control for liquidity does not
signiﬁcantly change the coeﬃcients of A-share and B-share turnover rates.
This is an indication that the eﬀects of A-share turnover rates on A-B share
premium do not result from the demand for liquidity.
The proportion of no-price-change days of B shares had a signiﬁcant and
positive eﬀect on the A-B share premium. This indicates that liquidity
was relevant for B-share prices, consistent with the results in Bekaert, Har-
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no-price-change days in A-shares was not statistically signiﬁcant for the
determination of the A-B premia. This agrees with our earlier argument
that illiquidity in A markets was not important. Panel B of Table 4 pro-
vides similar results by regressing A-B share premium on zA
it and zB
it only.
Dropping the turnover variables produces only negligible changes of the
point estimates of the no-trade days coeﬃcients.
4.3. Eﬀects of Asset Float
To further diﬀerentiate the eﬀects of speculative trading and liquidity
reasons, we examine the relation between the turnover rate of shares and
asset ﬂoat in both A-share markets and B-share markets.
Hypothesis 2 in Section 2 suggests that share turnover generated by
investors’ speculative motive decreases with asset ﬂoat. This is because
when investors are risk averse, a larger asset ﬂoat implies that it takes
a greater divergence in beliefs for asset owners to resell their shares at a
given price in the future.19 On the other hand, hypothesis 3 suggests that
share turnover is positively related to asset ﬂoat if liquidity reasons are
important. As ﬂoat increases, it is easier for buyers to match with sellers,
thus increasing the turnover rate.20
TABLE 5.
Eﬀects of Asset Float on Turnover and A-B Premium (Monthly, April
1993 - December 2000)
A. Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions for A shares
τ
A
it = α0t + α1t log(Float
A
i,t−1) + εit
α0t α1t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬀ. 1.408 −0.054 0.125
FM t-Stat 7.776 −5.854
B. Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions for B shares
τ
B
it = α0t + α1t log(Float
B
i,t−1) + εit
α0t α1t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬀ. 0.001 0.003 0.067
FM t-Stat 0.049 2.436
19Such a prediction is consistent with the observation by Ofek and Richardson (2003)
on the U.S. technology bubble. The turnover rates of Internet stocks dried up after a
dramatic expansion in the ﬂoat of shares in the spring of 2000, due to insiders’ selling
after the expiration of lock-ups.
20A positive correlation between share turnover and asset ﬂoat is supported by empir-
ical analysis on liquidity trading. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) attribute
the diﬀerence in the liquidity between on-the-run treasury bonds and oﬀ-the-run bonds
to the holding of oﬀ-the-run bonds by entities such as insurance companies that typi-
cally do not trade. Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) provide evidence of
a positive link between ﬁrm size, liquidity and turnover in U.S. stocks.SPECULATIVE TRADING AND STOCK PRICES 245
C. Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions for A-B Premium
ρit = c0t + c1t log(Shares
A
i,t−1) + c2t log(Shares
B
i,t−1) + εit
c0t c1t c2t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬀ. 19.58 −1.322 0.421 0.407
FM t-Stat 13.58 −16.03 10.24
Average Marginal R
2 0.427 0.074
This table presents monthly cross-sectional regression of A-share turnover
and B-share turnover, τA
it = log(1 + turnoverA
it) and τB
it = log(1 +
turnoverB
it), and A-B premium on the asset ﬂoat of the corresponding A
share and B share. In the regressions for turnovers, asset ﬂoat is measured
by the market valuation of all ﬂoating shares. In the regressions for A-B
premium, we use number of shares to measure ﬂoat to avoid the appear-
ance of share prices on both sides of regressions. The reported coeﬃcients
are the time-series average of monthly estimates, weighted by the number
of observations each month. The Fama-MacBeth t-stat is computed by the
weighted average of the coeﬃcients divided by the modiﬁed standard error
as in Petersen (2005) to control for diﬀerent sample sizes. Average Marginal
R2 is the time-series average of marginal R2 of the monthly cross-sectional
regressions.
We examine the eﬀect of ﬂoat on A-share turnover by running the fol-
lowing cross-sectional regression:
τA
it = α0t + α1t log(FloatA
i,t−1) + it.
The ﬂoat is measured by the market valuation of all publicly available
shares. The results are shown in Table 5 for the period April 1993 to
December 2000. Panel A shows that a ﬁrm’s A-share turnover decreased
with its ﬂoat, which is consistent with hypothesis 2, and the coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant.
A corresponding regression is conducted for B-share turnover and is re-
ported in Panel B. It indicates that, in the same period, a ﬁrm’s B-share
turnover increased with its own ﬂoat, and that the coeﬃcient is also signif-
icant. The positive relation between B-share turnover and B-share ﬂoat is
consistent with a liquidity story, as opposed to a purely speculative trading
theory. B shares were usually less liquid than A shares. When a ﬁrm’s B-
share ﬂoat became larger, more foreign investors (especially foreign institu-
tions) would be interested in trading in this share, and liquidity improved.
As a result, shares were turned over faster. The diﬀerent nature of A-share
and B-share turnover is consistent with our earlier result that speculative
trading was important for A-share prices but liquidity was important for
B-share prices.
Panel C also reports the cross-sectional regressions of A-B premium onto
A-share and B-share ﬂoat. In order to avoid the appearance of stock prices
on both sides of the regressions, we use number of ﬂoating shares to mea-246 JIANPING MEI, JOS´ E A. SCHEINKMAN, AND WEI XIONG
sure asset ﬂoat.21 The regression results show that A-B premium was
negatively related to A-share ﬂoat, and positively related to B-share ﬂoat.
Both of these relationship were statistically signiﬁcant. In particular, A-
share ﬂoat explained 43% of the cross-sectional deviation in A-B premium.
This strong link between A-B premium and A-share ﬂoat is consistent with
hypothesis 2 that asset ﬂoat could have a great eﬀect on the magnitude of
the speculative component. This strong link is also consistent with the
fall of U.S. Internet stocks in the spring of 2000 when asset ﬂoat dramat-
ically increased following the lockup expirations of many ﬁrms (Ofek and
Richardson, 2003).
4.4. Other Determinants of A-B Share Premia
Besides speculation and liquidity, the A-B share premia could also be
driven by diﬀerential demand curves of domestic and foreign investors, or
equivalently diﬀerent risks on a ﬁrm’s returns. To control for these eﬀects,
we incorporate various risk measures of both A-shares and B-shares into
the cross-sectional regression for A-B premia:
ρit = c0t + c1tτA
it + c2tτB
it + c3tCov(RBi,RF) + c4tCov(RBi,RB) (3)
+c5tCov(RAi,RA) + c6tV ar(RAi) + it.
The covariances of a ﬁrm’s B share returns with the Morgan Stanley world
return index, RF, and China’s B-share return index, RB, are measures of
risk in B-share markets. We measure systematic risk and ﬁrm speciﬁc risk
in A-share markets by the covariance between a ﬁrm’s A-share returns and
China’s A-share return index, Cov(RAi,RA), and the variance of the ﬁrm’s
A-share returns, V ar(RAi).22
The regression results are reported in Table 6 for the period April 1993 to
December 2000. A-share turnover was still highly signiﬁcant with a t-stat
of 5.9, and it explained 15.5% of the cross-sectional variations in A-B share
premium. Furthermore, the impact of a one standard deviation of A-share
turnover had at least ﬁve times the impact of a one standard deviation of
any of the four risk measures.
4.5. Panel Regressions
The Fama-MacBeth estimates do not account for ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects,
and this may result in an underestimation of standard errors (Petersen,
21We obtain similar results when we use market capitalizations, instead of number of
shares.
22These risk measures were the ones used by Eun, Janakiramanan and Lee (2001).
We have also examined a speciﬁcation that incorporates A-share and B-share asset ﬂoat.
Including ﬂoat would only slightly reduce the marginal R2 of A-share turnover. However,
because share turnover was directly related to asset ﬂoat, as we show in Section 4.3, we
do not report the results of this speciﬁcation to avoid potential econometrics issues.SPECULATIVE TRADING AND STOCK PRICES 247
TABLE 6.
Cross-Sectional Regressions of A-B Premium (Monthly, April 1993 - December 2000)
c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t c5t c6t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 4.136 2.642 2.426 15.597 −14.16 7.039 0.045 0.263
FM t-Stat 26.026 5.896 1.456 4.64 −19.91 3.559 0.192
Average Marginal R
2 - 0.155 0.041 0.013 0.03 0.02 0.009
This table presents a summary of the following monthly cross-sectional regressions:
ρit = c0t + c1tτA
it + c2tτB
it + c3tCov(RBi,RF) + c4tCov(RBi,RB)
+c5tCov(RAi,RA) + c6tV ar(RAi) + εit





it), Cov(RBi,RF) is the covariance between a ﬁrm’s B-share return and
the Morgan Stanley world return index, Cov(RBi,RB) is the covariance between a ﬁrm’s
B-share return and the B-share return index, Cov(RAi,RA) is the covariance between
a ﬁrm’s A-share return and the A-share return index, and V ar(RAi) is the variance of
a ﬁrm’s A-share return. The reported coeﬃcients are the time-series average of monthly
estimates, weighted by the number of observations each month. The Fama-MacBeth t-stat
is computed by the weighted average of the coeﬃcients divided by the modiﬁed standard
error as in Petersen (2005) to control for diﬀerent sample sizes. Average Marginal R2 is
the time-series average of marginal R2 of the monthly cross-sectional regressions.
2005.) As a further robustness check, we use a panel regression approach
that includes ﬁrm and time eﬀects. The following parsimonious form is
employed:
ρit = ui + c0t + c1τA
it + c2τB
it + it. (4)






(1). The uis deal with cross-sectional diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ characteristics
and the c0ts time-series variables such as Chinese and world interest rates,
equity premia and China’s political risks.
Table 7 summarizes the estimates. For the model described by equation
(4), the panel regression estimate of the coeﬃcient of A-share turnover is
about half of the Fama-MacBeth regression estimate in Table 2, but still
highly signiﬁcant with a t-stat exceeding 16. Our point estimate of the co-
eﬃcient of B-share turnover is now negative and signiﬁcant. This suggests
either the existence of a speculative component in B shares or the pres-
ence of time-varying ﬁrm speciﬁc liquidity. Since, unless there are omitted
variables, a random eﬀects estimate would yield gains in eﬃciency, we also
present the (almost identical) results of a random ﬁrm eﬀects model, that248 JIANPING MEI, JOS´ E A. SCHEINKMAN, AND WEI XIONG
TABLE 7.
Panel Regression of A-B premium (Monthly, April 1993-December 2000)
c1 c2 Adjusted R
2
I. Time eﬀects and ﬁrm Coeﬀ. 1.597 −1.203 0.702
eﬀects t-Stat 16.740 −3.400
Economic Signiﬁcance 0.164 −0.059
II. Time eﬀects and Coeﬀ. 1.623 −1.205 0.702
random ﬁrm eﬀects t-Stat 16.950 −3.390
Economic Signiﬁcance 0.166 −0.059
Speciﬁcation Test against A: χ
2 = 0.00 Not Rejected
This table presents estimates for the following panel regression:
ρit = ui + c0t + c1τA
it + c2τB
it + εit
where ρit is the A-B share premium for ﬁrm i in month t, τA
it = log(1 + turnoverA
it) and
τB
it = log(1 + turnoverB
it). The estimation is based on an unbalanced panel of 75 stocks from
April 1993 to December 2000. Speciﬁcation I allows time eﬀects and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, while
Speciﬁcation II allows time eﬀects and ﬁrm random eﬀects. The economic signiﬁcance is de-
ﬁned as the parameter estimate multiplied by the standard deviation of the exogenous variable
and then divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. The speciﬁcation test
is the χ2 test proposed by Hausman (1978).
assumes that ﬁrm eﬀects are uncorrelated cross-sectionally. A speciﬁcation
test described by Hausman (1978)23 does not reject this restriction.24
Equation (1) suggests that the time eﬀect term, c0t, incorporates the
eﬀects of variables such as Chinese interest rates, world interest rates, and
the risk premium from China’s political risk.25 For this reason, we examine
the following speciﬁcation for the time eﬀect coeﬃcient:
c0t = ϑ0 + ϑ1rChina + ϑ2rWorld + ϑ3iChinaSprd + t.
Intuitively, an increase in Chinese interest rates should lower the A-share
prices, and we should expect ϑ1 to be negative. Similarly an increase in
world interest rates should lower B-share prices, predicting a positive ϑ2.
Here we use the Chinese three-month deposit rate to proxy for Chinese
risk free rate rChina and US three-month Treasury bill rate for world inter-
est rate rWorld. Moreover, an increase in China’s political/sovereign risk,
23See also Wu (1973).
24We also conducted several other robustness checks for which we do not report de-
tailed estimates. For instance, the Hausman test rejects a model with random time
eﬀects. In addition, both a Durbin-Watson test, as modiﬁed by Bhargava et al. (1982),
and a Baltagi-Wu (1999) test do not reject the hypothesis that the errors in our panel
estimates are independent across time.
25Since ex-ante risk premia are diﬃcult to measure, we ignore the Chinese and world
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which we proxy by using the spread between Chinese long-term bond and
US 10-year bond (iChinasprd), should also lower B-share prices, yielding a
positive ϑ3.26
TABLE 8.
Explaining the Time Variation of c0t (Monthly, February 1994-December 2000)
ϑ0 ϑ1 ϑ2 ϑ3 Adj. R
2
Coeﬃcient −1.866 −0.683 0.187 2.473 0.851
t-Stat −1.355 −11.02 1.02 9.806
This table presents estimates of the time-series regression:
c0t = ϑ0 + ϑ1rChina + ϑ2rworld + ϑ3iChinaSprd + εt
where c0t is the time-eﬀect coeﬃcient from the panel regression in
Table 7 (speciﬁcation I) of A-B share premium on A and B share
turnover, rChina is the Chinese 3-month deposit rate, rworld is
the U.S. 3-month treasury rate, and iChinaSprd is the spread
between Chinese long-term bond and U.S. 10-year treasury bond.
The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors with 6 lags.
Table 8 presents the results for the time period February 1994-December
2000,27 using c0t estimated from speciﬁcation I of our panel regression.
The R2 is 85%, ϑ1 and ϑ3 have the right signs and are highly signiﬁcant,
while ϑ2 has the right sign but is not statistically signiﬁcant. Hence the
time eﬀect is well described by a combination of Chinese interest rates,
world interest rates and a measure of the political risks, and each of these
variables contributes with the expected sign, as consistent with the ﬁnding
of Fernald and Rogers (2002). While our results from the panel regressions
support the importance of the discount rates and political risk in explaining
the A-B share premium, they also demonstrate that the eﬀect of A-share
turnover still holds even after controlling for these other variables.
5. A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
On February 28, 2001, the Chinese government opened the markets for
B shares to domestic investors, provided they used foreign currency. Here
we examine whether the relationship among A-B share premium, share
turnover and asset ﬂoat changed after the regulatory shift.28
26Kim and Mei (2001) show that China’s political risk negatively aﬀects stock prices
in Hong Kong.
27Our sample here is shorter, since the Chinese Long-term bond data starts on Febru-
ary 1994.
28Karolyi and Li (2003) and Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2003) also study this rule
change. Their focus is on the eﬀects of liquidity and information asymmetry on the A-B
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TABLE 9.
Market Reactions to the Event of Opening B Shares to Domestic Investors
in February 2001
A. Price reactions (2/16/2001 3/09/2001)
N Mean STD
A share price changes 73 −0.5% 22%
B share price changes 73 63% 7.3%
B. Changes in monthly turnover of B shares (6 months before and after)
N Mean Median STD
Pre-event turnover 73 12.3% 10.5% 7.7%
Post-event turnover 73 44.4% 44.7% 15.8%
Ratio (Post/Pre) 73 3.62 4.25 2.06
This table presents a summary of market reactions to the opening of B shares
to Chinese domestic investors on February 28, 2001.
Table 9 reports the market reaction to the changes. Panel A shows that
from February 16, 2001 to March 9, 2001, A-share prices decreased on
average 0.5%, and the drop is statistically insigniﬁcant, with a standard
deviation of 22%. On the other hand, B-share prices increased 63% on
average and the increase is signiﬁcant with a standard deviation of only
7.3%. Therefore, most price reaction came from B shares.29 Panel B
shows the change in B share turnover rates around the change in regulation.
Before the event, B shares had an average monthly turnover of 12.3%, while
post-event it became 44.4%, similar to the A-share turnover rate reported in
Table 1. These observations indicate that after allowing Chinese domestic
investors to buy B shares, these shares behaved more like A shares, turning
over faster and with higher prices.
To further investigate the behavior of B-share markets after February
2001, we repeat the cross-sectional regression of Tables 2 and 3 (regressing
A-B premium to A-share and B-share turnover) for the period of March
2001 to December 2001. The results are reported in Part I of Table 10. The
coeﬃcient of A-share turnover is still positive and signiﬁcant, while the co-
eﬃcient of B-share turnover becomes negative and signiﬁcant, in contrast
to the results for the earlier period shown in Tables 2 and 3. This suggests
that a speculative component might have appeared in B-share prices after
29Although the summary statics in Table 1 shows that the asset ﬂoat of a ﬁrm’s A
shares and B shares are of comparable size, the aggregate size of A-share markets is
much larger than B-share markets (there were over 1000 ﬁrms that issued A shares, but
less than 100 ﬁrms that issued B shares). Thus, a small fraction of investors moving
their trading from A-share markets to B-share markets could cause a large impact on
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TABLE 10.
Regression Results after the Opening of B shares (Monthly, March 2001
- December 2001)
Part I: Cross-Sectional Regression of A-B Share Premium


























it is the proportion of
no-price-change days for the A-shares of ﬁrm i in month t, and z
B
it is the proportion
of no-price-change days for the B-shares of ﬁrm i in month t.
A. Turnover Only
c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 1.975 0.406 −0.433 0.086
FM t-Stat 20.223 2.927 −2.505
Average Marginal R
2 - 0.053 0.065
t-test of Change 9.937 5.951 1.364
B. Turnover and No Price Change Days
c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 2.011 0.387 −0.415 −0.743 −0.473 0.106
FM t-Stat 20.615 2.749 −2.390 −1.880 −0.600
Average Marginal R
2 - 0.052 0.062 0.010 0.014
t-test of Change 8.102 5.784 1.278 1.746 4.307
C. No Price Change Days Only
c0t c1t c2t c3t c4t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 1.927 −0.953 −0.805 0.026
FM t-Stat 38.24 −3.293 −1.013
Average Marginal R
2 - 0.009 0.018
t-test of Change 13.05 1.937 5.505
the rule change. These results remain unchanged after we control for liq-
uidity using the proportion of no-price-change days. In addition, we note
that the coeﬃcient of B-share liquidity becomes insigniﬁcant, in contrast to
the positive and signiﬁcant result for the earlier period. This indicates that
liquidity might no longer be a main determinant of B-share prices after the
increase in trading volume that followed the liberalization.
Part II of Table 10 reports cross-sectional regressions of A- and B-share
turnover rates on their ﬂoat after the rule change (similar to Panels A and
B of Table 5). This time, while the A-share coeﬃcient remains negative,
the B share coeﬃcient turns negative and signiﬁcant, which is the opposite
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Part II. Cross-Sectional Relation between Turnover and Asset Float
This part presents monthly cross-sectional regression of A-share turnover and B-share
turnover, τ
A




it = log(1 + turnover
B
it), on the corresponding
asset ﬂoat. Asset ﬂoat is measured by the market valuation of all ﬂoating shares.
A. Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions for A shares
τ
A
it = α0t + α1t log(Float
A
i,t−1) + ε
α0t α1t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 1.630 −0.069 0.138
FM t-Stat 3.790 −3.484
t-test of Change −0.476 0.687
B. Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions for B shares
τ
B
it = α0t + α1t log(Float
B
i,t−1) + εit
α0t α1t Average Adj. R
2
Average Coeﬃcient 0.766 −0.021 0.020
FM t-Stat 5.995 −6.478
t-test of Change −5.912 6.921
This table summarizes several cross-sectional regressions for the period after the opening of B-
shares. The reported coeﬃcients are the time-series average of monthly estimates, weighted by
the number of observations each month. The Fama-MacBeth t-stat is computed by the weighted
average of the coeﬃcients divided by the modiﬁed standard error as in Petersen (2005) to control
for diﬀerent sample sizes. Average Marginal R2 is the time-series average of marginal R2 of the
monthly cross-sectional regressions. We also provide a t-test of signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient
change post liberalization.
Table 5.30 A negative association between turnover and ﬂoat suggests that
after the opening of B-shares markets to local investors, trading in B-share
markets was driven more by speculation than by liquidity reasons.
Overall, our analysis of the 2001 relaxation of B-share restrictions shows
that while A-share markets were barely aﬀected, B-share prices and turnover
rates went up dramatically, indicating that after their entrance, specula-
tion by domestic investors may have become an important factor in B-share
markets.
6. CONCLUSION
We analyze a data sample from a market with perfectly segmented dual-
class shares to test the implications of the presence of short-sales constraints
and heterogeneous beliefs on asset prices and trading volume. Using the
30To see whether there is a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient change post liberalization, Table 10
also provides a simple t-test by comparing the mean coeﬃcient estimates post liberal-
ization to the corresponding mean estimates before liberalization. The results in Part
II show that while the coeﬃcient change in A share ﬂoat is insigniﬁcant, the coeﬃcient
change in B share ﬂoat is highly signiﬁcant.SPECULATIVE TRADING AND STOCK PRICES 253
foreign-share prices to control for variations in ﬁrms’ fundamentals, we ﬁnd
several results consistent with the existence of a speculative component in
the prices of domestic shares. First, the price diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s
domestic and foreign shares was positively related to the turnover rate of
the domestic share. Second, this positive association still holds after con-
trolling for several alternative eﬀects, such as liquidity, risk premium, and
discount rates. Third, the price diﬀerence between domestic and foreign
shares increased with ﬁrms’ idiosyncratic return volatility and decreased
with the ﬂoat of domestic shares. The turnover rate of domestic shares in-
creased with idiosyncratic return volatility and decreased with their ﬂoat.
We also provide further evidence through an analysis of a policy shift.
In many aspects, the price dynamics of the newly emerged Chinese mar-
ket resembled the technology bubble in the U.S. Our paper, using an en-
tirely diﬀerent data source, conﬁrms that investors’ speculative trading is
an important determinant of stock prices during bubbles, e.g., Cochrane
(2003), Lamont and Thaler (2003a) and Ofek and Richardson (2003).
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